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WHAT IS THE CONSTITUTION'S WORST 
PROVISION? 
Robert Post* 
I confess that when Sandy Levinson asked me to contribute 
to this Symposium I had a momentary flash of panic, the same 
searing sense of stammering inadequacy that always seems to 
well up whenever my ten-year-old daughter Amelia asks such 
pointed questions as "What is your favorite movie?" or "What 
color do you hate the most?" For someone like myself who per-
enially and professionally shifts among subdued shades of gray, 
celebrating nuance and complexity, such invitations to extreme 
and personal self-assertion are not only disruptive, they are 
downright painful. They flex muscles that have long atrophied. 
Swallowing my anxiety, however, and accepting the assign-
ment, I first faced a conundrum. What, after all, should count as 
the Constitution? I have in the past been critical enough of First 
Amendment doctrine that I have seen as deeply mistaken. But 
should such doctrine be treated as the Constitution for purposes 
of this Symposium? Probably not, because the question we have 
been asked to answer seems in its premises to point toward a 
specific and contained document, the one generally printed at the 
beginning or end of constitutional law casebooks. In this sense 
the question appears to embody an implicit distinction between 
amendment and interpretation. 
Perhaps because this distinction has relatively little meaning 
in the areas in which I work, I should be clear that I rarely in fact 
read the document of the Constitution. Although the document 
creates a profound structure of governance, it has always seemed 
to me to contain an extraordinarily sparse and haphazard collec-
tion of rules for the management of that structure. Because this 
Symposium is not the proper occasion to assess large and deep 
questions of constitutional design (such as whether the Constitu-
tion erred in failing to establish a parliamentary system), I felt 
compelled to tum to this odd (and largely unfamiliar) collection 
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of rules to find my candidate for the Constitution's worst 
mistake. 
. I was looking for a relatively clear rule that continues today 
m legal force and yet that somehow stands out as egregiously 
unacceptable. I thus ruled out the original constitutional provi-
sions dealing with slavery, for these have long since been discred-
ited and rendered inoperable. I also ruled out provisions like the 
direct tax clause (Art. I, § 9, cl. 4), whose meaning has never 
been very clear to me. 
Given these constraints, my final choice was Article II, § 1, 
cl. 5: 
No person except a natural born Citizen, or Citizen of the 
United States at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, 
shall be eligible to the Office of President .... 
The Clause is currently in force. It is remarkably innocent of 
both legislative history and judicial gloss.t Although it contains a 
number of important ambiguities, notably on the question of 
whether foreign-born children of American citizens qualify as 
"natural born, "2 the Clause is highly objectionable because it un-
mistakably and clearly prohibits naturalized citizens from becom-
ing President. 
Without doubt Joseph Story correctly identified the purpose 
of this prohibition as cutting "off all chances for ambitious for-
eigners, who might otherwise be intriguing for the office. "3 We 
might therefore understand the Clause as resting on three pro-
positions: It distinguishes citizens from foreigners; it reserves the 
Office of the Presidency for the former; and it classifies natural-
ized citizens with the latter. It is the third and last proposition 
that I find so disturbing. 
Our constitutional order does not ordinarily distribute the 
prerogatives of citizenship on the basis of where or how one is 
born.4 The Court has explained that this is because: 
1. See generally, J. Michael Medina, The Presidential Qualijicaticn Clause in This 
Bicentennial Year: The Need to Eliminate the Natural Born Citizen Requirement,12 Okla. 
City U. L. Rev. 253 (1987). 
2. On this question, see Charles Gordon, Who Can Be President of the Uniled 
States: The Unresolved Enigma, 28 Md. L. Rev. 1 (1968); Eustace Seligman, A Brief for 
Governor Romney's Eligibility for President, 113 Cong. Rec. 35, 109 (1967). 
3. Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States 541 
(Abridged Edition, 1833) (reprinted Carolina Academic Press 1987). 
4. For a possible exception involving so-called "Non-Fourteenth Amendment" citi-
zens, i.e., children of U.S. citizens who are born abroad, see Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815 
(1971). 
1995] SYMPOSIUM 
Citizenship is membership in a political society and im-
plies a duty of allegiance on the part of the member and a duty 
of protection on the part of the society. These are reciprocal 
obligations, one being a compensation for the other. Under 
our Constitution, a naturalized citizen stands on an equal foot-
ing with the native citizen in all respects, save that of eligibility 
to the Presidency.s 
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Our constitutional order, in other words, divides citizens from 
non-citizens on the basis of membership in our polity. Alle-
giance is the sign of membership. Because allegiance is a matter 
of voluntary commitment rather than birth, it should not system-
atically differ as between naturalized and natural born citizens. 
That is why virtually everywhere in our constitutional order "the 
rights of citizenship of the native born and of the naturalized per-
son are of the same dignity and are coextensive."6 The one ex-
ception is the clause of the Constitution we are now considering. 
The exception arises because the Clause makes a person's 
status at birth a proxy for allegiance. Thus at the very heart of 
the constitutional order, in the Office of the President, the Con-
stitution abandons its brave experiment of forging a new society 
based upon principles of voluntary commitment; it instead 
gropes for security among ties of blood and contingencies of 
birth. In a world of ethnic cleansing, where affirmations of alle-
giance are drowned in attributes of status, this constitutional pro-
vision is a chilling reminder of a path not taken, of a fate we have 
struggled to avoid. It is a vestigal excrescence on the face of our 
Constitution. 
5. Luria v. United States, 231 U.S. 9, 22 (1913). 
6. Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 165 (1964). 
